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The broad objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance. 
Time series data from 166 firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange market from 2005 to 2012 in the Food and Beverages 
sector was used for the study. We adopt the log of profit after tax as the measure of performance. The study found a positive 
and significant relationship between independent directors on audit committee and firm performance in Nigeria. The study 
suggests the need for a competent and sizeable board and a cut down on the waste of resources on too frequent board 
meetings as the findings reveals that there is a negative relationship between board diligence and performance. The study also 
gave emphasis on the need to strengthen the independence of audit committee to continuously achieve the control mechanism 
and oversight functions. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Issues of governance and corporate performance have received serious empirical consideration in recent times. This 
unending enthusiasm on governance research may have been sustained by the high profile corporate demise, financial 
scandals and the global financial meltdown resulting in general loss of public confidence and investors apathy. Corporate 
governance transcends the daily management of business activities (Bairathi, 2009). Corporate governance is dynamic 
and appears broader than the conventional management practices. It is concerned with transparency in business 
dealings, probity and accountability, ethical conduct, fairness and strict compliance with both regulatory and ethical 
standards. Against the backdrop of the robustness of governance issues, one fundamental question becomes pertinent: 
do board characteristics affect the performance of the organisation? 
This study explores the relationship between board characteristics and corporate governance performance against 
the backdrop of the trade-off between investors’ risk minimisation and returns maximisation. It is expected that 
organisations with strong governance practices should enjoy a market premium. But there has been conflicting empiric on 
board characteristics and firm performance. This lack of convergence is the driving force behind this current study. 
Our study is about the first large-scale long time horizon study of this topical issue having focus on 166 firms of the 
Food and Beverages sector of the Nigeria Stock Exchange, from 2005 to 2012 which is approximately 8 years. We use 
the log of accounting construct of profit after tax to capture performance instead of the usual barrage of performance 
variables in line with the views of Van Ness, Miesing and Kang (2010). All independent variables were selected based on 
extant empirical literature.  
Contrary to expectation, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between board size and firm 
performance. This result debunked the Berle and Means (1932) board failure hypothesis which states that boards lack 
the incentive and capability to objectively represent the interest of shareholders. The results run contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that larger boards decrease firm performance.  
The study advances an extensive developing country perspective, since the global financial crisis requires a multi-
dimensional approach. It is one of the very few post financial crisis study of governance and performance dynamics that 
integrates both large scale firms and extensive period. 
We proceed as follows: Section II focus on review of extant literature on board characteristics and corporate 
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performance nexus. Section III presents the data source and methodology with emphasis on the analytical framework 
and model. The estimation results and discussion of findings is in section IV while section V presents the concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Review of Prior Studies 
 
2.1 Board Size and Firm Performance 
 
The boards of directors ensure that organisations operate within the law and uphold the fiscal integrity of such operation. 
The relationship between board size and firm performance has received serious empirical consideration with the earliest 
being Lipton and Lorch (1992). Their study recommended a board size of 7 or 8 and concluded that larger board size 
may result in time consuming effort in decision making. Boards monitor management to reduce the level of agency costs 
and also chart the strategic course for the organsation, to eliminate dinosaur dynamics – too big to change. Bathula 
(2008) focusing on a sample of 158 Countries from 2004 to 2007 for New Zealand quoted companies, found a positive 
relationship between board size and firm performance. Larger boards can distribute the workload through the use of 
committees to ensure in depth analysis of issues and avoid burn out. VanNess, Miesing and Kang (2010) focused on 
American listed firms from 2006 to 2007 and discovered that larger boards increase revenue. What this portends for the 
organsation is that the diverse expertise and experience of the board members impacted positively on the revenue 
growth of the organisation. In the same vein, Daily and Dalton (1993) and Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2013), found a 
significant positive relationship between board size and firm performance.   
 
2.2 Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance  
 
Audit committee forms part of the internal control mechanism of the firm and helps to strengthen corporate governance. 
Klein (2002) is of the opinion that audit committee independence decrease with increase growth tendency of the 
organisation. They believe that the independence of the audit committee may reduce the growth potentials of the 
organisation as the internal auditors and management focus more on meeting the requirements of the committee thereby 
shifting attention from the core business of the organisation. Krishnan (2005) posits that independent audit committee and 
committee with the requisite expertise will help to reduce internal control issues in the organisation. Even though, the 
reduction may not necessarily translate into increased growth (Hsu, 2008). Mak and Kusnadi (2005) focusing on 
Singaporean and Malaysian companies, found no significant relationship between firm value and audit committee 
independence. In the same vein, Hutchinson and Zain (2009) studied 60 Malaysian companies and found no positive 
relationship between audit committee independence and corporate performance. Their result signifies a conflict effect 
between audit committee and internal audit quality. 
 
2.3 Board Diligence and Firm Performance 
 
Board diligence here refers to the number or frequency of board meetings. While some studies advise against frequent 
board meetings, others believe that frequent meetings will enhance the performance of management. Gosh (2007) found 
a statistically significant impact of board diligence on firm performance, noting that 10% increase in diligence increases 
the performance of the organisation by 1%. Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2013) used financial and non financial data from 
companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange market in 2009. The result of the study reported a negative 
relationship between board diligence and financial performance. The implication of the finding is that less frequent, but 
meaningful meetings should be encouraged. Frequent meetings will result in diverting organizational resources to less 
productive activities (Chorsch & Maclver, 1989). This negative relationship is also consistent with Johl (2013) and Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992). However, others believe that infrequent board meetings will result to insignificant influence on the 
activities of management (Mace, 1996 and Useem, 2006). 
  
2.4 Board Independence and Firm Performance 
 
A board is said to be independent, when the number of independent ,non-executive directors not associated with top 
executives of the firm are more. MillStein (1993) is of the view that directors who are independent of management can 
perform their oversight functions better. Yemack (1996) reported a significant negative correlation between independent 
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directors and performance measured by Tobin’s Q. in the same vein, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) reported a negative 
correlation between independent directors and Tobin’s Q. Klein (1998) also reported negative correlation between 
performance expressed as a change in market value of equity and independent directors. Bhagat and Black (2002) using 
a sample of 934 American firms between 1985 to 1995 found no positive relationship between board independence and 
firm performance in United States of American. 
Event studies of appointment of outside directors are also found to exert positive influence on corporate 
performance (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). Even though according to Bhagat and Black (2002), the improved performance 
from event studies may be attributable to signaling effect. Johl et al (2013) found a negative relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. This means higher ratio of non-executive directors does not necessarily affect the 
performance of the organisation.  
 
2.5 Board Expertise and Firm Performance 
 
The functional experience and professional background of board members has now been recognized as very significant 
germane to the performance of the organisation. The fundamental question therefore is: does the inclusion of finance 
professionals on the board increase the performance of the orgnisation? Agrawal and Chadha (2005) found board 
expertise to be associated with a lower incidence of restated earnings. VanNess, et al (2010) investigated board of 
directors composition and corporate performance and found a negative relationship between board expertise and firm 
performance. This means the intricacies of daily business activities, transcends professional expertise and earnings 
growth requires greater entrepreneurial skills which finance knowledge, may not necessarily confer. Gentenbein and 
Volante (2012) focused on 1574 directors firm 224 Switzerland quoted companies and reported a negative relationship 




3.1 Theoretical Framework and Model Specification 
 
The framework for the analysis of board characteristics and corporate performance is the stakeholder’s theory. The 
choice of the theory is premised on the limitation of the shareholders theory which we consider too narrow to address the 
board characteristics dynamics. According to Freeman and Reed (1983), stakeholders may be viewed from two 
perspectives as: groups who ensure the existence and success of the organsation and groups, individuals capable of 
affecting and being affected by the organisation. Stakeholders include employees, financial customers and communities. 
In accordance with the stakeholders enabling rules, directors have a duty of care to exercise reasonable judgment in 
piloting the affairs of the organisation. Extant literature has identified a set of explanatory variables collectively referred to 
as board functionalities. These board activities are thought to affect the performance of the organisation.  
Assume a linear relationship between profitability and the board variables of: size, independence, expertise, 
diligence and audit committee independence.  
Board size is believed to have a negative relationship with corporate performance (Bhagat & Black, 202; Yemack , 
1996) even though some established positive relationship between board size and firm performance. Therefore,  
PAT = f (BDSIZE)       (i) 
Independent directors on the board have reported a mixed empirical reaction with some declaring negative 
relationship (Yemack, 1996; Klein, 1998). And others reported positive impact (VanNess et al, 2010; Bathwal, 2008). 
Hence,  
PAT = f (BDIND)       (ii) 
The expertise of the board of directors has also been studied as explanatory variable in board researches 
(Gantenbein & Vocante, 2012): Hence, 
PAT = f (BDEXP)       (iii) 
Board diligence, a proxy for number of board meetings has also received attention on studies of board 
functionalities and corporate performance (Gosh, 2007). Therefore,  
PAT = f (BDDILI)       (iv) 
The independence of the audit committee has also received serious empirical consideration in modern times (Mak 
& Kusnadi, 2005). Hence, 
PAT = f ( AUDIND)       (v) 
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Combining the five equations in a functional form, 
PAT = f (BDSIZE, BDIND, BDEXP, BDDILL, AUDIND)         (vi) 
In econometric form: 
 (vii) 
Where: 
PAT = natural log of the value of profit after tax (the dependent variable) 
BDSIZE = board size  
BDIND = board independence  
BDEXP = board expertise 
BDDILI = board diligence, which is the number of board meetings attended by the board of directors 
AUDIND = the independence of the external auditors 
U = error term 
 = unknown coefficient of the variables. It is presumptively expected that  that  is the size of the 
board of director will negatively affect profitability.  . More independent directors cannot be influenced by 
management and hence should increase profit. .  
The  variables in our model are operationalised in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Variables, Definitions and Notations 
 
Variable Notation Definition Expected sign 
Profit after tax PAT This is taken as natural log of profit after tax  
Board size BDSIZE This is the total number of directors on the board negative 
Board independence BDIND This is the number of independent directors on the board Positive 
Board expertise BDEXP Education, skills and professional status of directors Positive 
Board diligence BDDILI A measure of the number of board meetings Positive 
Audit committee independence AUDIND Number of independent directors on the audit committee positive 
 
Source: Researchers’ Compilation 2014 
 
3.2 Data Source and Estimation Technique 
 
Data for this study is a combination of longitudinal and time series data from 166 firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange market from 2005 to 2012. The study is a content analysis of the financial statements of all companies in the 
Food and Beverages sector of the Nigerian bourse. Contrary to most extant studies, we adopted the log of profit after tax 
as the measure of performance.  
 
4. Estimation Result and Discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Diagnostics  
 
Table 11: Pooled Descriptive Analysis 
 
PAT BDSIZE BDIND BDEXP BDDILI AUDIND 
Mean 4705.89 9.114458 0.582097 2.746988 4.415663 1.065764 
Maximum 173511 18 3.6667 4 18 3 
Minimum -11254 3 0.1111 1 2 0.6667 
Jarque-Bera 64538.18 9.24327 671.9122 55.14691 7872.043 1825.014 
Probability 0 0.009837 0 0 0 0 
Observations 166 166 166 166 166 166 
 
Source: Researchers’ Compilation, 2014 
 
From the result, the average profit after tax is N4705.89 billion and varies between N173.5113 and N11.2543. The 
0 1 2 3 4 5 5it it it it it it tLogPAT BDSIZE BDIND BDEXP BDDILI AUDINDXα α α α α α μ= + + + + + +
1 5,...,α α 1 0α <
1 0α <
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E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
                                   Vol 4 No 1 
                            March 2015 
 
 287
average board size in our sample is 9.11. This is consistent with Jensen (1993) and francis, Hasan and Wu (2012). The 
minimum board size is 3 with a maximum of 18 directors. We find 58.2% level of board independence which is consistent 
to Francis et al (2012) who found 60% board independence. The large Jarque-Bera statistics are indicative of normality of 
the regression variables couple with the (0.000) probability values.  
 
Table 111: Results of the Variance Inflation Factor Test 
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered
Variable Variance VIF VIF
 
C 60525403 57.56072 NA
BDSIZE 183444.5 15.60567 1.112780
BDIND 3038011. 2.006997 1.028029
BDEXP 4000348. 29.93101 1.223218
BDDILI 438702.7 9.176194 1.041324
AUDIND 13524845 15.68464 1.074874
Source: Researchers’ Compilation, 2014. 
 
The results of the variance inflation factor shows that all the variables in the regression model are relevant to the study, 
with VIF factors all below the benchmark of 10, which is indicative of the absence of multicollinearity. The DW statistics of 
1.95 (fixed effect model) and (1.77) (random effect model) are both substantially close to the (2.00) mark which signifies 
the absence of autocorrelation.  
 
Table 1V: Results of the White Heteroskedasticity Test and Breusch-Godfrey Serial LM Test 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
F-statistic 1.932174 Prob. F(4,161) 0.1076 
Obs*R-squared 7.603706 Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.1072 
Scaled explained SS 149.0450 Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.0000 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 1.269150 Prob. F(2,158) 0.2839 
Obs*R-squared 2.624656 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2692 
Source: Researchers’ Compilation, 2014. 
 
According to White (1980), the presence of heteroskedasticity can lead to inefficient parameter estimates and faulty 
inferences. To circumvent the problems of inefficient parameter estimates and faulty inferences, we tested for 
heteroskedasticity using the white test and the results revealed the absence of heteroskedasticity. F-statistic and 
obs*Rsquared with p-values of (1.93) and (1.60) respectively. The probabilities of (0.10) and (0.10) exceeds the 5% level 
of significance. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test with probability values of (0.28) and (0.26) respectively 
indicates the absence of autocorrelation in the regression model since the f-statistic and obs*Rsquared are greater than 
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Table V: The Results of the Hausman’ Test 
  
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
  
Period random 2.136065 5 0.8300 
  
  
Source: Researchers’ Compilation, 2014 
 
The result of the Hausman’s test is presented in Table 5. The Hausman’s test helps to determine whether the fixed or 
random effect approach of panel data analysis is appropriate. The result from the test shows chi-square value of (2.13) 
with a probability value of (0.83) which exceeds the p-value of (0.05), which confirms the supremacy of the fixed effect 
model 
 
Table V1: Results from the Pooled OLS, FEM and REM 
 
POOLED OLS RANDOM EFFECT MODEL FIXED EFFECT MODEL 
Dependent Variable: PAT
C -22528 -21765.49 -39683.49 
(-2.86)*** (-2.73)*** (-3.84)*** 
BDSIZE 2740.62 2663.24 3818.54 
(6.32)*** (6.08)*** (5.95)*** 
BDIND 1820.46 2037.34 1113.91 
(1.03) (1.14) (0.46) 
BDEXP -3857.40 -3507.02 -1967.68 
(-1.90)** (-1.71)* (-0.71) 
BDDILI 321.42 159.66 -192.53 
(0.47) (0.23) (-0.22) 
AUDIND 9731.89 9326.74 14254.89 
(2.61)*** (2.45)*** (3.49)*** 
R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.42 
Adjusted-R-Squared 0.22 0.20 0.31 
F-Statistics 10.63 4.29 3.65 
DW-Statistics 1.77 1.78 1.95 
 
Source: Researchers’ Compilation 2014 
 
The coefficient of multiple determination shows the explanatory power of the independent variables to be (0.42). This 
means that over 42% of the variation in profit in Nigeria is accounted for by the explanatory variables. The f-statistics of 
the fixed effect model of (3.65) shows the statistical significance of the model at the 5% level.  
Contrary to expectation, we found a positive and statistically significant relationship between board size and 
performance with a t-value of (5.95) at the 1% level. This means that larger board size increases the performance of 
quoted firms in Nigeria. The descriptive statistics reported a mean board size of 9 members. Large board size allows for 
effective operating committee and adhoc committee even though too many committees can also be counted productive 
through burnout. Our positive significant relationship is consistent with the change, prospect, perspective of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997); Bathula (2008); VanNess et al (2010) and Johl et al (2013). Even though other studies (Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992 and Bhagat & Black, 2002), found negative relationship between board size and firm performance.  
The parameter of board independence was found to be positive but statistically insignificant having reported a t-
value of (0.46). The result is not surprising since the mean independence value is seen to be 58% which is slightly above 
average. What this means is that independent directors on the board does not affect the performance of the organisation. 
Our finding is consistent with the insignificant relationship reported by Yemack (1996); Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); 
Klein (1998) even though their studies reported negative relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. 
Board expertise is negative and statistically insignificant with a t-value of (-0.71). This means the financial expertise 
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of board members does not necessarily translate into improved performance. The result is however not surprising. This is 
because in addition to the fact that the sample under study is not drawn from the financial sector, corporate management 
transcends financial expertise. According to Desendor (2009), as may be applicable to manufacturing companies which is 
our centre of focus, knowledge of the industry, competitors, and regulations may be more important. The result 
corroborates VanNess et al (2010) who opined that revenue growth goes beyond financial expertise to serious 
entrepreneurial efforts and Gantenbein and Volonte (2012) who focused on companies with different divisions and 
departments. 
Board diligence coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant with a t-value of (-0.22) which means increase 
board meetings reduces the performance of the organisation. Increase in board meetings according to Johl et al  (2013) 
amounts to channeling hard earned resources from productive to unproductive activities. Board meetings should be less 
frequent to avoid unnecessary wasting of quality time and effort. This position is consistent with Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
and Gosh (2007). 
Audit committee independence is positive and statistically significant with a robust t-value of (3.49) signifying that 
independent audit committee will improve the oversight function of the committee which will no doubt translate into 
improved corporate performance. Audit committee forms part of the entire organisational control mechanism which helps 
to fortify corporate governance practices though there are evidences that there is possibility of conflict effect between 
audit committee effectiveness and internal audit quality (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Hutchinson & Zain, 2009). It is therefore 
imperative to strike a balance so as to avoid distractions occasioned by conflict of interest. According to Krishnan (2005), 
independent audit committee will help to reduce possibility for internal control crisis in organisations.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The paper examined board characteristics and corporate financial performance dynamics using a combination of co-
integration and error correction mechanism. The estimated results suggested positive relationship between board size 
and corporate financial performance. The study reports a mean board size of 9 which is consistent with Jensen (1993) 
and Francis et al (2012). Also, we find a positive and significant relationship between independent directors on audit 
committee and firm performance in Nigeria. Board diligence and board expertise are both negative and insignificant. 
The study no doubt presents a developing economy perspective on the relationship between board structure and 
corporate performance against the backdrop of the conflicting reports in extant literature. Our study contributes to the 
existing body of knowledge: our finding of positive relationship between board size and firm performance debunked the 
Berle and Means (1932) board failure hypothesis which states that boards lack the incentive and the capacity to 
objectively champion the course of shareholders.  
While this study does not foreclose future researches in the topical issue, our analysis presents interesting policy 
considerations. First, the positive impact of board size on corporate performance suggests the need for a competent and 
sizeable board. Secondly, the is need to cut down on the waste of resources on too frequent board meetings as the study 
reports a negative relationship between board diligence and performance. Third, the positive relationship between 
independent directors on audit committee suggests the need to strengthen the independence of audit committee to 
continuously achieve the control mechanism and oversight functions. The analysis did not however address the financial 
sector of the Nigerian economy which appears more turbulent. Extending the study to the Nigerian banking sector 
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